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It is commonly argued that catastrophic effects of physical shocks are recovered 
consequentially due to internal adjustment mechanisms economies retain. The 
theoretical literature on growth implications of earthquakes relies on the same 
premise, by and large, putting relatively minor role on the shoulders of governments 
as an external source in recovering from catastrophic effects of an earthquake. This 
paper elaborates theoretically whether there is an indispensable role for government 
during recovery from the destructive effects of an earthquake. To this end, we 
employ a specific growth environment, namely AK framework, which imposes 
constant ratios on the quantities of the model from the start. It follows that, when a 
physical shock hits the economy, the model fails to restore these conditions 
automatically. The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it shows 
that an indispensable role for government in restoring equilibrium after an 
earthquake is a theoretical possibility. Second, it advances our understanding on the 
procedure of restoring equilibrium when there are fixed ratios between quantities, 
an issue that is not known very much in the literature. 
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John Stuart Mill (1904, Book I, Chap.5) has noted long time ago that: 
 
“ (…) what has so often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries 
recover from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all 
traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the ravages 
of war. An enemy lays waste a country by fire and sword, and destroys or 
carries away nearly all the moveable wealth existing in it: all the inhabitants are 
ruined, and yet in a few years after, everything is much as it was before”. 
 
It would not be wrong to say that many economists, sharing Mill’s observation, 
believe that an economic system would converge to its (long-run) equilibrium, 
whatever the magnitude of a physical shock on stock variables. One possible source 
of this common belief (bias?!) among economists is the prevalence of non-increasing 
returns to scale in overall production, which makes economic models essentially path-
independent, and decreasing returns in specific production factors, which makes for 
rapid recovery from negative shocks. We think that a more inherent source of this 
belief owes to the conviction that “damages due to natural disasters are damages to 
stocks, whereas economists tend to think in terms of flows” (Tol and Leek, 1999, 
p.311). If flows are secured, it is natural to deduce that the unexpectedly shrunk stocks 
will be replenished through time.
1 The critical question that has not been discussed at 
a satisfactory level is whether the new equilibrium attained by the economy after a 
physical shock is the original (equivalently, optimal) equilibrium or not. 
The unconditional recovery allegation has also been widely accepted/ argued in 
studies investigating the growth implications of earthquakes. For example, Oulton 
(1993) and Kepenek et al. (2001) argued that economies would (quickly) recover 
direct costs of earthquakes by relying on self-mechanisms. Some other studies like 
Albala-Bertrand (1993a, 1993b) and Selcuk and Yeldan (2001) assign some role to 
government in their studies. However, these studies (i) have not provided any 
legitimization on why government must shoulder a role, (ii) assign a secondary role to 
                                                           
1 Tol and Leek (1999) note that some flow quantities like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), gross fixed 
capital formation, manufacturing, and public-sector spending grow after a natural disaster. 
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 government during recovery in the sense that the government’s role is limited to 
initiating/ accelerating growth. For example, Selcuk and Yeldan (2001) utilized an 
applied general equilibrium model to estimate the transition path of the Turkish 
economy to its new equilibrium after the devastating 17 August earthquake, and to 
obtain the market solution policy options to mitigate the negative effects of the 
earthquake. The government has two interrelated functions in the model: (i) to collect 
taxes, distribute transfer payments, purchase goods and services, (ii) to administer 
domestic public debt. Selcuk and Yeldan (2001) study four different assumptions via 
simulations: (i) no policy change; (ii) reliance on indirect taxes to finance the extra 
government expenditures for public investments to replenish the losses in the capital 
stock; (iii) endogenous adjustments on the existing indirect taxes to recover the loss in 
the capital stock; (iv) invigoration of foreign aid to recover the capital loss. They find 
that while a subsidy financed by foreign aid to individual sectors to recover the capital 
loss yields the best outcome (which is trivial), an indirect tax to finance the extra 
fiscal spending would result in an output loss, further deepening the impact of the 
earthquake on the economy (which contradicts with the initial aim of accelerating the 
adjustment). The study of Selcuk and Yeldan (2001) shows clearly that the intuition 
behind using the government as an external source of adjustment after an earthquake 
is to accelerate the adjustment. However, there is no theory in the literature backing 
why it is the government that must take on this role. 
This paper contributes to the discussion made above in the following way. First, it 
demonstrates that an economic system may recover from the detrimental effects of a 
catastrophic shock without relying on external support, but the new equilibrium may 
not be the optimal one (i.e., the original equilibrium). Second, it shows how 
government (the social planner) may take a role in restoring equilibrium. Hence, the 
paper concludes that there may be an indispensable role for the government in 
restoring optimal path.  
We employ a very specific growth environment, namely the “ AK  setup”, in this 
paper. There are three reasons for using this set up in order to show the inevitable 
need for government involvement during restoring equilibrium. First, we argue that 
“automatic recovery” from physical shocks is basically due to diminishing marginal 
productivity assumption. A shock lowering the stock of an input (say, physical 
capital) implies increasing productivity of the input, which brings off convergence to 
steady state equilibrium in the long-run (a good example to this statement is the basic 
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 Solovian framework, in which a shock on the physical capital is certainly recovered 
due to the neoclassical properties of the model). We need to remove this assumption if 
our aim is to assign an indispensable role for the government. Second, an interesting 
characteristic of “ AK  models” (or patterns that are reduced to  AK  models without 
generating transitional dynamics) is its enforcement of constant ratios among 
variables of the system from the start. Thus, if the path of one variable is known, then, 
necessarily, the time-paths of the rest are also known in these setups, given parameter 
values. What makes these models interesting from the viewpoint of shocks is that the 
constant ratios are not tolerant to disturbances. In other words, the conditions need to 
be restored as quickly as possible and preferably immediately, if an unexpected shock 
(e.g., an earthquake) causes a deviation from these conditions because otherwise 
intertemporal maximization of the objective function cannot be accomplished. 
Noticeably, the aforementioned environment is a very special one, and the system is 
in need of social planner’s intervention (i.e., the market dynamics do not contain a 
self-sufficient mechanism that ensures convergence to the normal path). Third, our 
aim is to show that the need for government in restoring the optimality requirements 
is not a short run problem but a long-run one indeed. The  AK  set up, which is a 
highly stylized and aggregated representation of long-run equilibrium from the start, 
provides an excellent environment in that respect. 
AK
This study can be seen an extension (and revision) of Chapter 5 of Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995) from the viewpoint of solution procedure employed. In that chapter, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (henceforth BSM) discuss, in an extended   model, how to 
restore a constancy condition between physical capital and human capital after a 
physical shock on capital (e.g., war) or on human capital (e.g., epidemic). In their 
study, BSM argue that a temporary optimization policy that restricts the growth of the 
abundant quantity while letting the scarce variable grow after a shock is sufficient to 
restore constancy condition. We will follow the same intuition in our work, but offer a 
revised solution procedure. Hence, our contribution in this chapter lies also on 
proposing a more refined solution procedure as much as on discussing the role of the 
social planner on adjustment dynamics after a physical shock.
2 
The roadmap of the paper is as follows. We employ an augmented  AK  model to 
derive fixed conditions among quantities of the model. We assume that the model-
                                                           
2 A more detailed critique of BSM’s solution procedure can be found in Yetkiner (2003). 
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 economy accumulates two stock variables, namely physical capital and housing in the 
form of foregone consumption. Hence, there is a competition between the housing and 
capital sectors for the forgone consumption. Our motivation for defining two types of 
stock quantities is the empirical regularity that an earthquake has different 
implications on the housing stock (residential buildings) and productive capital. The 
model derives a constant ratio between capital stock and housing that must be kept 
from the start if welfare is to be maximized. Next, we assume that an earthquake hits 
the housing sector while leaving the capital sector unaffected.
3 Clearly, it would not 
make qualitatively any difference to assume that the earthquake hits also the capital 
sector. Focusing on a single stock just helps us to put forward our argument in a 
simpler way. The problem of the social planner is how to restore the constancy 
conditions among the variables of the model after an unexpected earthquake. We 
show that adjustments to constancy conditions after a shock require the limitation of 
growth of undisturbed quantities of the model. The mechanism we propose, which is 
indeed substantially simple, restores the constancy ratios under a temporary 
optimization problem. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The second section studies the most 
basic  AK  model for the purpose of making an introduction into the case of constancy 
conditions. The third section presents our model, which contributes to the literature in 
two ways. First, it demonstrates a refined solution procedure for restoring constancy 
conditions. Second, it shows the theoretical possibility that social planner may play an 




2 The  Basics 
 
Constancy conditions arise in  AK  type models or in models that ultimately reduce to 
AK  form without generating transitional dynamics. The basic  AK  model is the 
natural starting point for familiarizing with the condition. Define the overall utility as 
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where   is aggregate consumption,  C ρ  is the discount rate, and θ  is the (absolute) 
value of elasticity of marginal utility. We assume that  0 > ρ  and  0 > θ , and that the 
population is normalized to one and does not grow. 
The production function is defined as 
 
AK Y =           ( 2 )  
 
where Y  is aggregate output,   is the exogenous technology parameter, and  A K  is the 
aggregate physical capital stock. The model is closed by the macroeconomic budget 
constraint 
 
K C AK K δ − − = &          ( 3 )  
 
where  K &  is the instantaneous rate of change in the capital stock and δ  is the rate of 
depreciation of capital. The solution of this problem is part of many textbooks (e.g., 
BSM (1995)) and we will not elaborate it here. The system generates steady state 
growth without transitional dynamics: 
 
θ
δ ρ − −
= = =
A
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In (4), g  is the rate of growth (a hat over a variable indicates the rate of change of the 
respective variable). A steady state growth without transitional dynamics entails also 
that variables of the system, namely consumption   and physical capital  C K , hold a 
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 Hence, there is a constant ratio between capital and consumption, starting from initial 
values   and C . Consequently, consumption is not a free choice but a function 
of initial capital stock, given parameter values. This is called a “closed-form policy 
function” (see BSM, 1995, p.143, footnote 3). Furthermore, the condition is “binding” 
not only once-and-for-all but permanently, implying that the constant ratio between 
consumption and capital must be satisfied at all times. Finally, it is worth to note that 
a change on the right hand side of equation (5) does not violate the condition but just 
alters ‘the rule’ in accordance with the change. A violation arises if any of the 
quantities on the left-hand side (i.e., physical quantities) is upset. BSM offered a 
solution procedure in chapter 5 of their 1995 book for restoring constancy conditions 
after a disturbance. We next look briefly at the solution procedure suggested by them 
before presenting our model and the procedure. 
) 0 ( K ) 0 (
BSM (1995, pp. 172-9) discusses a two-sector growth model, which reduces into 
an  AK  model without generating transitional dynamics. The familiar first order 
conditions of the maximization problem generate constancy conditions in the model. 
Next, BSM (1995) question what happens if one of the conditions is upset due to a 
physical shock. BSM (1995) state that constancy conditions dictate adjustments, 
preferably instantaneously, in the disturbed ratios. They add that instantaneous 
adjustment (“reversible investment”) is not viable because “it depends on the 
possibility of an infinite positive rate of investment in one form of stock and an 
infinite negative rate of investment in the other form” (BSM, 1995, p.175). They 
argue that a more realistic assumption is to limit the growth of the abundant stock 
variable while the scarce stock variable is allowed to grow. Their interpretation is that 
the social planner realizes that the economy has too much of one of the stocks in 
relation to another stock, but since it is infeasible to have negative gross investment in 
the abundant stock, the practically feasible option is to force gross investment to zero. 
BSM argue that the temporary optimization problem will restore the condition in 
finite time and thereafter the system will return to original position (which is 
necessary in order to maximize the objective function). 
We showed in Yetkiner (2003) that BSM’s solution procedure has caveats though 
the intuition they developed is suitable. We will not discuss these caveats again in this 
paper but directly apply the solution procedure offered in Yetkiner (2003). This is 
done in the next section. 
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3 The  Model 
 
In this section, we develop a two-sector  AK  model where one sector produces output 
and the other generates housing stock by using physical capital as input. Details of the 
model are as follows.
















e H C U
t        ( 6 )  
 
where C  is aggregate consumption, H  is the stock of accommodation units (houses), 
ρ  is the subjective rate of discount factor, γ  is the housing characterization 
parameter, and θ  is the (absolute) value of elasticity of marginal utility. We assume 
that 0 > ρ , 1 0 < < γ ,  0 > θ , and that population is normalized to one and does not 
grow. We also assume  1 ) < 1 ( −θ γ  to get diminishing marginal utility with respect to 
housing. The overall utility function has the following properties. First, elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and housing stock is one. Second, elasticities of 
marginal utility with respect to consumption and housing are constant (θ  and 
) 1 ( 1 θ γ − − , respectively). Thus,  ) 1 ( 1 θ γ θ − − >  () 1 ( 1 θ γ θ − − < ) is guaranteed under 
1 > θ  ( 1 < θ ), implying that, ceteris paribus, the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of consumption (housing) is greater than the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of housing (consumption). Hence, relatively speaking, the more rapid is 
the proportionate decline in marginal utility of consumption (housing) in response to 
increases in   ( C H ), and hence the households are less willing to accept deviations 
from a uniform pattern of C  (H ) over time. 
The production function is defined as 
 
AK Y =           ( 7 )  
 
                                                           
4 See Smith, Rosen, and Fallis (1988, p.33) and Nielsen and Sørensen (1994) on how to introduce 
housing sector into a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
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 where  Y  is aggregate output,   is exogenous technology parameter, and  A K  is 
aggregate physical capital stock. 
In this model economy, part of resources is used for producing new houses. We 
conjecture that the net housing investment is captured by: 
 
H I H H H δ − = &         ( 8 )  
 
In Equation (8), H &  is the instantaneous change in the housing stock,   is the gross 
investment for producing housing goods, and 
H I
H δ  is the depreciation rate of houses. 
Note that we ignore completely housing quality for matter of focus. 
The closure of the model is done by the macroeconomic budget equation. The 
constraint is 
 
H K I K C AK K − − − = δ &         ( 9 )  
 
where  K &  is instantaneous rate of change in the capital stock and  K δ  is the rate of 
depreciation of capital. Thus, we described the full properties of the model. 
The complete solution procedure of the model is not very different than of the 
standard  AK  model. For that reason, we shall skip it. It is straightforward to show 
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It is also easy to demonstrate that the two-sector AK model imposes constancy 
conditions on C  and   for all t. In particular, we find these 
conditions as 
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+ + = ) ( . These conditions entail that all variables are 
interdependent and that we can trace the time paths of all variables from an initial 
condition of one variable, say, housing. 
What is the importance of these constancy conditions from the viewpoint of 
physical shocks in our model? Suppose that a shock hits the housing stock at time T  
and destructed a substantial size of it. Then, constancy conditions would be upset, and 
we need to restore them in the model. Intertemporal maximization demands 
adjustments (discrete or gradual). Discrete-adjustment, which includes infinite 
resource transfers between variables, is not appealing practically. Therefore, we need 
a scheme for gradual adjustments in order to attain maximization conditions. This can 
only be done by setting up a temporary maximization problem by the social planner. 




The Definition of Earthquake 
In this paper, we define an earthquake a catastrophic event that destroys a significant 
amount of housing units. In particular, we assume that the housing stock is declined 
by some, say χ , percentage due to an earthquake at time T :  e
 
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
− + − = e e T H T H χ         ( 1 3 )  
 
where   denotes time T  just before an earthquake, and T  represents the time 







Simple response Policy 
In Yetkiner (2003) we discuss that there are infinite number of policy combinations 
that the government may follow in order to restore equilibrium. A rigorous selection 
must be based on a welfare comparison, which is not practically possible. 
Nonetheless, intuition suggests that a ‘good’ policy is immediate restriction of growth 
of undisturbed variables in the model until the required constancy conditions are 
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 restored, given that discrete adjustment is not possible. This is so because the later the 
equilibrium is restored, the higher the chance that the government is not minimizing 
the welfare loss. We call the policy of immediate restriction of growth of undisturbed 
variables as ‘simple response policy’ owing to the fact that the policy-maker follows a 
very simple scheme in order to restore constancy conditions. Noticeably, This is also 
the ‘strategy’ suggested in BSM (1995). 
Before moving to the representation of solution, let us illustrate the impact of an 
earthquake on the time path of housing, and of restricting undisturbed variables. 









K, H, C 
 
Figure 1. Restriction of undisturbed variables 
(drawn linear for matter of presentation) 
 
 
In figure 1, at time  , an earthquake hits the economy (the housing sector) and thus 
the constancy conditions between 
e T
K  and H , and C  and H  are disturbed. Since there 
is more than one condition, it is not possible to restore them without constraining the 
growth of all undisturbed variables. As figure 1 shows, we must restrict then the 
growth of K  and   immediately after the earthquake and release them to grow at the  C
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5 We will use   and T  interchangeably whenever it is clear that time t  refers to just-before-
earthquake. point that H  reaches the pre-earthquake level. This is the requirement that an 
algebraic formulation of the problem should solve. We next turn to our example for 
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Suppose that the social planner agrees to restrict undisturbed variables immediately 
after the disturbance. The restriction implies setting up a temporary optimization 
problem, where the only unknowns are housing and ‘restoration’ time. The temporary 
problem starts at T  and ends at time 
+
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where initial value is  , terminal value is  , 
terminal time 
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e e H T H ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) ( χ − =
+ e gT e H T H ) 0 ( ) ( =
T  is unknown, and 
e gT e C C ) 0 ( =  and 
e gT e K K ) 0 ( = . The problem 
specified in equation (14) is essentially a calculus of variations problem.
6 We can re-
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of   implies that the Euler equation is  ) (⋅ F
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Together with fixed endpoint transversality condition [  and initial 
and terminal values, the Euler equation identifies the path of 
0 ] = − =T t HH F F &
&
H .
7 Details of the 
                                                           
6 Note that there is no need to use state-space constraint on the problem because, given that there is a 
single unknown in the model, the terminal time of the temporary problem is effectively the state-space 
constraint on the variable. 
7 See equation (2.19) for Euler equation and (3.11) for transversality condition in Chiang (1992). 
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 solution are as follows.
8 First, applying the Euler equation formulation, we end up 
with a second order differential equation 
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where  , and c  and c  are constants. Equation (18) indicates that housing 
stock increases as new investments are made. The three unknowns of (18) are c ,  , 
and 
] , [ T T s e
+ ∈ 1 2
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T . We also have three equations: 
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Equation (19) and (20) are derived from the initial and terminal time conditions, 
respectively, and equation (21) is obtained from the transversality condition. Note 
from equation (20) (as well as from (18) at  T s = ) that 
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8 An alternative solution procedure is possible. Note that equation (16) implies  . Hence, 
, where c  is a constant. Starting from this observation, we can easily determine the housing 
path. Refer to Chiang (1992) for details. 
0 ) ( / = H F dt d &
1 c FH = & 1
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. In that case, non-
trivial solution of equation (21) implies that the first component on the left-hand side 
of that equation cannot be zero and the second term must be zero. Hence, we derive 
from (21) that 
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to solve analytically (19), (20) and (23) in order to 
find out explicit values of c ,  , and  1 2 c T . We run a small experiment for a set of 
hypothetical parameter values just to check what these equations imply.
9 Our 
numerical experiment shows that it takes 2.334 ‘years’ to recover a 50 percent 
reduction in the housing stock after an earthquake when  8 . 0 = θ  and 12.974 ‘years’ 
when  8 . 1 = θ , where the earthquake hits the model economy at ‘year’ 80. These 
simple simulations approve our initial discussion that households are less willing to 
accept deviations from a uniform pattern of housing (relative to consumption) when 
1 < θ . Since our aim is not to explore the exact time path of recovery, we consider it 
sufficient to run a single experiment. What we are sure is that the solution procedure 
will lead to a growing housing stock path while other quantities of the model are kept 
constant, and eventually the constancy conditions will be satisfied. Naturally, the 
temporary problem imposed by the social planner will be lifted at the time that the 
constancy conditions are attained. Finally, it is worth to mention that policy shocks 
(e.g., consumption taxation) may be additionally used to accelerate the pace of 
restoring optimality conditions. Since they would not change the essential 
characteristics of the model, we skip them in this paper for matter of briefness. 
 
Discussion 
Physical shocks in general and earthquakes in specific can result in severe economic 
losses. The received view is that the economic impacts of earthquakes (and natural 
14 
 disasters) should be recoverable in time by relying purely on the internal dynamics of 
the economy. We show however that markets may sometimes fail to achieve efficient 
outcomes after natural disasters. The model poses an indispensable role for 
governments during recovery from natural shocks. In that respect, this study shows 
theoretically that government involvement during recovery from a shock might be 





This paper has achieved two things. First, we showed that (i) a model economy might 
not necessarily return to optimal (i.e., original) equilibrium after an earthquake by 
relying on internal dynamics, and (ii) the social planner’s intervention might indeed 
be the only means for restoring constancy conditions. Hence, we showed that there 
might be an indispensable role for government involvement in restoring long-run 
equilibrium. Second, this study contributed to the literature by advancing our 
understanding on the solution procedure of restoring optimality conditions (within the 
limits of the example). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 . 0
9 The hypothetical parameter values are as follows:   or  ,  ,  , 
,  ,  ,  ,  , and  .  80 = Te 04 . 0 = K δ 05 . 0 = H δ
07 . 0 = A 8 . 0 = γ 8 . 1 = θ = θ
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